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ABSTRACT
For 50 years the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has been confronted with a Muslim insurgency in Mindanao. The grievances which underpin this insurgency and the insurgents political objective of independence are deep rooted, extending back into the Spanish Colonial Period. The Marcos Administration launched a complex web of initiatives to defeat this insurgency. As variations of these efforts persistently failed over several decades across a succession of presidential administrations, many observers contend that this insurgency is a "wicked problem" that cannot be solved -only managed. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) considers new strategic opportunities pursued by the current GRP for the purpose of forging a fair, just and lasting resolution to the Mindanao Muslim Insurgency. This paper argues that this long standing conflict is "ripe for resolution" and provides substantive recommendations to advance the GRP-MILF Peace Process towards a successful conclusion. The MILF formally emerged in its current form in 1984. Norte. 18 The MILF attacks and associated violence left 286 killed and injured, 19 and approximately 700,000 civilians were displaced. This violence also intensified the Christian majority's demands that the GRP abandon the MOA-AD.
In response to the Supreme Court's Temporary Restraining Order and public reaction, the government abandoned the MOA-AD. Even before the Court's oral arguments on the constitutionality of the agreement had begun, government lawyer Agnes Devanadera announced on 29 August 2008 that the government would no longer sign the MOA-AD. 20 In an attempt to preserve the credibility of President Arroyo, she added that the President did not even know the contents of the MOA-AD, since the panels refused to present it to the President until after it was finalized. 21 To further show the government's intent to disavow the agreement, the negotiating panel, led by retired General Rodolfo C. Garcia, was dissolved on 4 September 2008. 22 Finally, on 14
October 2011, the Supreme Court ruled the MOA-AD unconstitutional because it was crafted without sufficient consultation with all interested parties. 23 To this day, there is much speculation as to whether the public really understood The consensus reached by the peace panels 25 in the MOA-AD was a far cry from the original position of the MILF. Initially, only 735 Barangays were subjected to accession to the conceptual Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). 26 The BJE includes villages adjacent to the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), located in Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Cotabato City, Iligan City and Isabela City. However, their accession to the BJE was dependent upon the results of plebiscites. 27 Since the BJE was envisioned to be an empowered ARMM, the 1987
Philippine Constitution had to be amended to provide for a quasi-federal relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. The government peace panel emphasized that since the plebiscites and amendment to the Philippine Constitution should take place before the MOA-AD was certified as a Comprehensive Compact, the whole peace process would necessarily be subject to legal and democratic processes.
The negotiations were conducted secretly to minimize interference from highly partisan groups. At the same time, however, there was an imperative to expedite the process based on an order from the Office of the President. 28 This order was issued to hasten an acceptable accord prior to the impending withdrawal of Malaysia from the IMT on 31
August 2008.
Unfortunately, the Arroyo Administration was perceived to be harbouring a different agenda -to amend the Constitution in order to extend President Arroyo's term of office. President Arroyo's appointment of one of her favorite generals, former AFP Chief of Staff Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., as the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) at such a critical time only reinforced speculation that there was an ulterior political motive behind the peace agreement. Thus, it seemed that the collapse of the MOA-AD and the peace talks was caused by President Arroyo's machinations.
Ultimately, the collapse of the GRP-MILF peace process was a casualty of her administration's lack of credibility. In his inaugural address on 30 June 2010, President Aquino stated that his administration would deal in good faith with the peoples of Mindanao. 30 He further promised that his administration was -committed to a peaceful and just settlement of conflicts, inclusive of the interests of all -may they be Lumads, Bangsamoro or
Christians.‖ 31 In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) in July 2011, President
Aquino reiterated his commitment and issued his first policy statement on his vision for the Mindanao peace process:
We will learn from the mistakes of the past administration, that suddenly announced an agreement reached without consultations from all concerned. We are not blind to the fact that it was done with political motivation, and that the interest behind it was not that of the people. reduction of poverty and vulnerability through community infrastructure and focused delivery of social services; improvement in governance through partnerships with national and local institutions, building capacities for governance, and enhancement of transparency and accountability mechanisms; and empowerment of communities and strengthening of their capacity to address issues of peace through activities that ensure participation and inclusion. 35 Unfortunately, the MILF viewed PAMANA as a -systematic counterinsurgency strategy‖ 36 because it focused on establishing conditions that would eventually render the insurgency irrelevant.
Despite this -cool‖ reception, formal negotiations between the GRP and MILF resumed on 09 February 2011. 37 At the outset, the MILF presented their revised proposal for the creation of a sub-state in Mindanao. 38 In turn, to demonstrate his it was made on the basis not only of it being an agreement that the Government is bound to uphold, but also because President Aquino personally believes that this is an investment worth taking if there will be a shift in paradigm, from a culture of war to a culture of peace, cooperation and good governance among the Bangsamoro. 58 Regardless of these unwelcome developments, GRP Chairman Marvic Leonen expects a negotiated political settlement in the first quarter of 2012. 59 The President Finally, CSOs and international NGOs should be enjoined to proactively engage in the peace process in matters of conflict prevention, peace-building, and peace education. Over past decades, regardless of the administration, these organizations have tirelessly promoted peace in Mindanao in many ways. They will not refuse a government that requests their support. This is because peace in Mindanao is their avowed mission and reason for being in the Philippines.
Conclusion
The probability the GRP-MILF peace process will result in a substantive peace agreement is better now than ever before. Hence, conditions are indeed -ripe for a resolution.‖ A 15-year old negotiation has been substantively reinvigorated. Positive and conclusive signs include events in the initial 15 months of President Aquino's administration. The peace panels on both sides should be lauded for moving the peace talks forward, notwithstanding spoilers such as the massacre of the Special Forces soldiers in Basilan and the deadlock on the -3-in-1‖ proposal. The President's political capital is a significant contributing factor to the progress of the peace process -his administration learned much from the lessons of the past as it rebuilt peace mechanisms. President Aquino's bold move to meet the MILF Chairman, over significant objections, demonstrated more than anything else his commitment to peace and to the process for achieving it.
Following through on the President's successes is a different matter altogether.
The administration should seize the momentum and capitalize on the President's popularity. Within the first six months of 2012, a peace agreement must be forged with the MILF, especially since empowering Bangsamoro authority requires a constitutional amendment. So far, the public believes that President Aquino is not interested in pursuing political power after his current term. So when he promotes a constitutional change, the public will likely believe in his sincere intentions. As demonstrated in the earlier collapse of the MOA-AD, public support and public perception is crucial to the success of the peace process.
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